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In a series of articles published over the last decade, Adrian Vermeule has established himself as one of the smartest and most interesting theorists of statutory interpretation in the American legal academy. His new book uses the insights of those articles to advance a
striking thesis: judges interpreting federal statutes (and, for that matter,
the Constitution itself) should do much less work than most of them
currently do. In Vermeule's words, "judges should sharply limit their
interpretive ambitions, in part by limiting themselves to a small set of
interpretive sources and a restricted range of relatively wooden decision-rules" (p 4).
As this formulation suggests, Vermeule revels in the counterintuitive. On occasion, indeed, readers may well wonder whether he is more
interested in persuading them or in provoking them. But the book has
all the virtues of the articles that form its backbone. Its analysis is dispassionate and incisive. Its sources are wide-ranging, reflecting the
remarkable breadth of Vermeule's intellectual interests and attainments. And its exposition-especially as compared to other academic
writing-is downright beautiful. While some of Vermeule's prescriptions are unlikely to win adherents, confronting his logic will help readers
better understand the premises of their own preferred approaches.
I. A GUIDE TO VERMEULE'S

ARGUMENT

Vermeule himself describes the book as "advanc[ing] two distinct
theses" about legal interpretation (p 1). First, and less controversially,
he argues that one cannot sensibly advocate a particular interpretive
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approach without paying close attention to the capacities of the decisionmakers who will be applying it. Even if Approach A would unquestionably produce better results than Approach B if both were applied perfectly, one cannot automatically conclude that real-world decisionmakers should therefore use Approach A; an interpretive theory
that would be wonderful in the hands of omniscient and omnicompetent interpreters might be dreadful in the hands of interpreters who
lack the information or cognitive ability that proper application of the
theory requires. To determine whether particular decisionmakers
should adopt a particular interpretive method, one must therefore
consider what the method asks them to do and how good they are
likely to be at doing it. One must also consider how, if at all, their use
of the method might affect the future behavior of other relevant actors. In Vermeule's words, "legal theory cannot reach any operational
conclusions about how judges, legislators, or administrative agencies
should interpret texts unless it takes account, empirically, of the capacities of interpreters and of the systemic effects of interpretive approaches" (pp 1-2).
According to Vermeule, prior scholarship has been insufficiently
attentive to this point (pp 13-59). To be sure, scholars have long recognized the relevance of institutional capacities to interpretive theory.'
But Vermeule argues that the theorists who have paid attention to this
issue have failed to analyze it properly. Rather than providing "an institutional account that is realistic about the capacities of all relevant
actors," they either have contented themselves with stylized pictures of
the different branches of government or have "compare[d] a worst-case
picture of one institution to a best-case picture of another" (pp 17-18).
The second aspect of Vermeule's project, and the core of the
book, is to try to do better. Given our current governmental institutions and the current state of our knowledge about their capacities,
Vermeule aims to develop an institution-specific approach to interpretation. In particular, Vermeule asks two main questions: how should
interpreters within the federal judiciary go about interpreting federal
statutes, and to what extent should interpreters in federal administrative agencies be free to use different techniques?' Ultimately, he advo1
See Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 Mich L Rev 952, 954-55 (2003) (citing examples in response to the
article on which this portion of Vermeule's book is based).
2
At various places in the book, and especially in the final chapter, Vermeule also discusses how judges should interpret the federal Constitution. But the bulk of the book is about
statutory interpretation, and so is this Review.
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cates a dramatic shift in interpretive authority from courts to agencies.
When no agency is in the picture, Vermeule urges judges to eschew the
quest for interpretive perfection in favor of keeping decision costs low
(pp 192-96). The result is a truly original interpretive theory-one
that, for better or for worse, does not reflect how any federal judge
currently acts.
Part I of this Review summarizes the gist of Vermeule's argument. Parts II and III explain why I am not entirely persuaded.
A. "The Stalemate of Empirical Intuitions"
Suppose that you have just been appointed to the federal bench,
and you are trying to identify the interpretive techniques that you
should use to interpret federal statutes. In your judgment, neither the
federal Constitution nor any other source of federal law answers the
methodological questions that you confront (pp 31-33). Your new colleagues, moreover, disagree with each other to a sufficient extent that
you cannot simply defer to an existing consensus (p 132). You must
engage in what Vermeule calls "interpretive choice" -the selection,
conscious or not, of a particular methodology from among an array of
possible alternatives (pp 66-67).
Your first step, one might think, will be to identify some metric
against which to judge the likely results of different methodologies.
That task might seem daunting; so-called textualists are said to have
very different views about the high-level goals of statutory interpretation than so-called intentionalists or purposivists (pp 82, 202-05). But
while Vermeule does not question the true extent of this disagreement,3 he treats it as being largely irrelevant to how judges should behave. In his view, we do not have enough information about the realworld consequences of different interpretive techniques for the existing disagreements about high-level goals to matter much in practice
(pp 2-3, 63,289).
For the sake of simplicity, then, let us stipulate that you have a
fairly typical view of what statutory interpretation is all about. Although the concept of legislative intent is complicated, you do not
think it meaningless,' and you care about some version of "intended
3 For recent commentary doing so, see generally Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 Colum L Rev 1 (2006); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347
(2005); Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, "Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free InterpretationIs an Impossibility,41 San Diego L Rev 967 (2004).
4
See Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 371 (cited in note 3) ("[Tlhe fact that the notion of 'intended
meaning' requires some aggregation of competing views does not mean that it is entirely inco-
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meaning"; you want the directives that interpreters enforce to correlate in some way with the directives that members of the enacting legislature understood themselves to be establishing, and you would consider it a serious problem if your chosen interpretive methodology
impeded effective communication between the courts and conscientious members of Congress. But you would also consider it a serious
problem if your chosen methodology impeded effective communication between Congress and the public at large (or, more realistically,
the lawyers who advise people in the private sector about their legal
obligations); you recognize that statutes are not secret messages from
Congress to the courts, and you think it important for their meaning to
be accessible both to the electorate and to the people whom the law
regulates. You also want to keep the costs of the interpretive process
within reasonable bounds for all concerned; interpretive techniques
that would delay your processing of other cases or substantially increase the expense of litigation are not necessarily desirable, even if
they might marginally improve the accuracy of the results that you
reach in individual cases. Finally, you care about public policy. While
you respect the limits of your institutional role and recognize that
Congress has policymaking priority in our system, you believe that
interpreting Congress's statutes often entails some subsidiary policy
choices, and you want those choices to promote rather than detract
from overall social welfare.
In theory, you can use this set of goals to structure your thinking
about the more particularized questions of interpretive practice that
currently divide the federal judiciary. To determine your stance on the
use of legislative history, for instance, you might ask whether supplementing statutory text with committee reports and other documents
generated during the legislative process will help you better understand the directives that members of Congress collectively intended to
establish, whether any incremental benefit along these lines will justify
the cost of the necessary research, and whether your reliance upon
such research will make the law's operational meaning less accessible
to the public at large. Unfortunately, different interpreters have dramatically different intuitions about the facts that bear on these issues.
Justice Scalia asserts that it is very rare for members of Congress to
herent, or that every possible method of aggregation is just as sensible as every other possible
method of aggregation."). See also Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation,93 Georgetown L J 427, 437-49
(2005) (discussing both philosophical theories of collective intent and psychological research
about the attribution of intent to groups).
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have formed a true collective intention, of a sort that they mean to be
authoritative, on matters that the statutory text leaves unclear; Justice
Stevens suggests that such collective understandings are more common.' Justice Scalia adds that judges who are insulated from the legislative process will not be very good at using legislative history to reconstruct whatever collective understandings did in fact exist; Justice
Stevens has more faith in the typical judge's capacity to assess the legislative history and to sort reliable statements from unreliable ones.' Justice Scalia suggests that legislative history encourages judges to find
ambiguity where none really exists, and thereby magnifies the range of
policies that judges can attribute to the statute; Justice Stevens believes
that the use of legislative history tends to constrain the discretion that
judges confronting statutory texts would otherwise indulge.!
These and other disputes about the use of legislative history are em-

pirical, in the sense that they relate to facts and that an omniscient observer would know which side has the better argument. But Vermeule

plausibly suggests that the current state of our empirical knowledge
does not permit us to resolve them with any confidence. What is more,
there is little prospect of designing and executing empirical studies

that will change this situation (p 162). We are left with what Vermeule
calls "the stalemate of empirical intuitions" (p 153): Justice Scalia acts
upon his intuitions about the facts, Justice Stevens acts upon his competing intuitions, and neither can prove the other wrong.
According to Vermeule, the same stalemate characterizes a host

of controversies about interpretive methodology (pp 162-63). Take,
5
Compare Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law 32
(Princeton 1997) ("[W]ith respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the
courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are
bound to be false."), with West Virginia University Hospitals,Inc v Casey, 499 US 83, 112-15
(1991) (Stevens dissenting) (drawing a contrary lesson from various cases in which Congress
passed new statutes to override Supreme Court decisions that "ignored the available [extratextual] evidence of congressional purpose").
6
Compare Conroy v Aniskoff, 507 US 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia concurring in judgment)
("If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history."),
with Exxon Mobil Corp v Allapattah Services Inc, 545 US 546, 125 S Ct 2611, 2630 (2005) (Stevens dissenting) (arguing that committee reports have "special significance as an indicator of
legislative intent" because "busy legislators and their assistants rely on [such reports] in casting
their votes").
7
Compare Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 35-36 (cited in note 5) (arguing that
"[l]egislative history provides ...a uniquely broad playing field" and that its use "has facilitated
...decisions that are based upon the courts' policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of
law"), with BedRoc Limited, LLC v United States, 541 US 176, 192 (2004) (Stevens dissenting)
("A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained,
increases the risk that the judge's own policy preferences will affect the decisional process.").
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for instance, debates about the importance of relatively rule-like canons of construction, such as the presumption against reading federal
statutes to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. When a judge is
trying to determine whether a facially ambiguous federal statute exposes states to suits by individuals, what weight should he put on this
generic presumption, and what sort of statute-specific clues about the
enacting Congress's understandings should be capable of trumping it?
Someone trying to answer this question might want to know how often
Congress collectively intends to abrogate the states' immunity without
making this intention clear on the face of its statutes, what kinds of
clues (if any) Congress tends to leave when it forms such a collective
intent, how accurately the judge can identify and process those clues,
how an additional judge's invocation of the presumption against abrogation might affect Congress's behavior in the future, and how the
costs of erroneously finding abrogation where it was not intended
compare to the costs of erroneously denying abrogation where it was
intended. But the real-life judges who must decide cases cannot answer these questions with any confidence. All they have are their intuitions, and those intuitions differ from judge to judge.
B.

Borrowing Tools from Decision Theory

Vermeule's main ambition, and the distinctive contribution of his
book, is to use the tools of decision theory to break stalemates of this
sort. In particular, Vermeule seeks to cope with the problem of "uncertainty" - the fact that judges do not have (and cannot acquire) much
of the information on which a rational decisionmaker would want to
base his choice of interpretive methodology.8
8
As Vermeule notes, the problem of "uncertainty" (which involves gaps in the information available to a decisionmaker) is distinct from the problem of "bounded rationality" (which
involves limitations on the decisionmaker's ability to process the information that he does have).
Early on in his discussion, Vermeule suggests that one can safely lump these problems together
when discussing interpretive choice (pp 154-55). Because they play somewhat different roles in
his analysis, however, I will try to keep them separate. For Vermeule, the problem of bounded
rationality is one of the many concerns that bear on the selection of an interpretive methodology; other things being equal, an interpretive methodology should not ask judges to perform
tasks that they will be bad at performing (pp 2-3). It follows that in an ideal world, someone
choosing an interpretive methodology for a particular judge would be well informed about the
types of processing errors to which the judge is prone. Unfortunately, we do not have very good
empirical information on this subject, either about individual federal judges or about the tendencies of judges in general. The extent to which federal judges can reliably process legislative history, for instance, is one of the subjects on which Vermeule detects a "stalemate of empirical
intuitions" (p 190). Thus, some of the "uncertainty" with which interpretive choice must cope
relates to the problem of "bounded rationality." Still, these two problems lie on different planes.
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To lay the groundwork for his analysis, Vermeule gives readers a
quick primer. In the jargon of decision theory, someone who acts under conditions of "risk" has all of the information needed to calculate
the expected cost or benefit of his decisions; he knows not only all of
the possible outcomes that might result from each of the options that
he is considering, but also the probability of each outcome and its
payoff (p 171). Someone who must act under conditions of "uncertainty" is not so fortunate; he knows the possible outcomes and their
payoffs, but not the relevant probabilities (p 171). Under what Vermeule sometimes calls "severe uncertainty," indeed, he does not have
any reliable sense of the probabilities at all (p 173).
As Vermeule explains, decision theorists have analyzed various
techniques for coping with severe uncertainty. Vermeule does not purport to formulate a general theory about which techniques are best,
but he does select a few that, in his view, have useful applications in
the context of interpretive choice. Two techniques in particular seem
to do most of the work in his subsequent analysis. The first, the "principle of insufficient reason," tells decisionmakers who can identify all
the possible consequences of each option under consideration, but
who have no reliable idea of the relevant probabilities, to assume that
all of the unknown probabilities are equal and then to proceed as they
would in a situation of mere risk (pp 173-75). The second, the "maximin criterion," tells decisionmakers who cannot use the principle of
insufficient reason (perhaps because they do not know how to partition the relevant outcomes) to try to avoid disaster by "choos[ing] the
option whose worst possible outcome is better than the worst possible
outcomes of the alternatives" (pp 175-76).
For these techniques to make sense, of course, decisionmakers
must genuinely face severe uncertainty. But Vermeule posits that
many of the questions that are important to interpretive choiceincluding but not necessarily limited to questions on which judges'
empirical intuitions are currently deadlocked -satisfy this condition.
Vermeule begins with the question of legislative history. Even if
all judges agreed that statutory interpreters should pursue the intended meaning of statutory language, different judges would have
different intuitions about whether their use of legislative history
would advance or retard this high-level goal. Judge Smith might believe that legislative history frequently contains valuable information
and that consulting it will edify her more often than it misleads her;
Judge Jones might believe the opposite. According to Vermeule, however, neither judge should have any confidence in her intuitions on
this topic. If both judges were thinking clearly, each would recognize
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that her subjective assessment of the relevant probabilities is simply
not meaningful, because no one has the data necessary to reach an
informed conclusion. In Vermeule's opinion, there is "severe uncertainty" about whether judges will do better by consulting legislative
history or by ignoring it (pp 189-90).
That premise will strike some scholars as implausible. People who
want judges to consult legislative history often quote Chief Justice
Marshall's rationale for considering a statute's title when trying to
resolve ambiguity in the statute's operative provisions: "Where the
mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every
thing from which aid can be derived."9 According to people who take
this statement literally, judges can be expected to make better decisions when they take account of more information, and so a strategy
of flatly ignoring the available legislative history is more likely to reduce judges' accuracy rates than to improve them. As Vermeule notes,
however, that conclusion rests on some unprovable assumptions. In
the real world, where decisionmakers are not perfect and information
is not complete, it is at least possible that decisionmakers can increase
their accuracy rates by disregarding some categories of information
altogether- particularly when the decisionmakers would not be very
good at processing that sort of information or when the information
that would be available to them is likely to be skewed in ways that
they cannot detect. Notwithstanding the contrary intuitions of many
scholars, Vermeule sees no reason to assume that judges who try to
read the tea leaves of legislative history will tend to reach more accurate results than judges who do not.
Of course, Vermeule also sees no reason to make the opposite assumption. But given what he considers "severe uncertainty" on this
point, Vermeule nonetheless contends that decision theory should
lead judges to adopt a categorical rule against consulting legislative
history. If judges currently can have no reliable idea whether the use
of legislative history moves their results closer to or further from the
high-level goals that statutory interpretation should serve, then the
principle of insufficient reason tells judges to assume that both possibilities are equally likely (p 192). Yet while the other costs and benefits of using legislative history are uncertain, its effect on "the direct
costs of litigation and decision" is not; legislative history can be "voluminous," and there is fairly widespread agreement that it is "expensive to research" (p 193). Vermeule concludes that a rational judge
9

United States v Fisher,6 US (2 Cranch) 358,386 (1805).
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should therefore refrain from considering legislative history: given the
current gaps in our empirical knowledge, judicial use of legislative
history cannot be expected to improve the decisional process (because
the possibility of benefits is effectively counterbalanced by the possibility of harms), but it can be expected to increase the costs of the
process itself (p 193).
Vermeule reaches similar conclusions about many of the canons
of construction that courts sometimes invoke (pp 198-202). To be sure,
when generalist judges must resolve interpretive questions without
guidance from specialists in administrative agencies, Vermeule does
not object to their using default rules to handle certain issues that
statutory language often raises but does not resolve. For instance, when
a statute "contains a list that can either be read as exhaustive or illustrative," or when it is unclear "whether the statute applies to American
firms outside the United States or only domestically" (p 200), interpreters need to resolve the matter one way or the other. Although judges
might try to handle such questions on a statute-by-statute basis, Vermeule thinks it sensible-and perhaps even inevitable-for them to
establish some default rules instead. But he encourages judges not to
spend much time trying to figure out which way to set the defaults,
and to spend no time at all trying to fine-tune them in individual cases.
His argument follows the same structure as his analysis of legislative
history: efforts along these lines will increase "decision costs" without
achieving any predictable benefits (p 201).
Vermeule is much less tolerant of canons whose use does not strike
him as inevitable. In particular, he encourages judges to abandon various "dice-loading rules,"'0 such as the canon that ambiguities in federal
statutes should be resolved in favor of Native Americans (p 199), the
similar principle favoring veterans (p 200), and perhaps even the rule
of lenity (p 202). In Vermeule's view, having more canons rather than
fewer marginally increases the costs of litigation and decision (p 198); the
decisional apparatus becomes more complicated, conflicts among the
canons become more likely, and people have to figure out the precise
contours of each of the specialized rules in question. To the extent that
particular canons have obvious distributive effects, moreover, they are
likely to generate "persistent disagreement over the[ir] content," and
the resulting variations will both increase decision costs and reduce
whatever benefit might otherwise flow from establishing rules of con-

10

1borrow

in note 5).

this term from Justice Scalia. See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretationat 28 (cited
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struction (p 199). According to Vermeule, experience bears out this
point; judicial application of the rule of lenity, for instance, has been "notoriously sporadic and unpredictable" (p 135)."
For similar reasons, Vermeule urges scholars to stop promoting
so-called "democracy-forcing rules"-canons that courts allegedly can
use to make members of Congress deliberate more carefully about
matters that judges deem especially sensitive (pp 132-33, 198). As
Vermeule notes, the presumption against retroactivity, the canon of
avoidance, and a variety of other rules of thumb are often defended in
these terms (p 133). Indeed, Cass Sunstein has encouraged courts to
adopt a host of additional canons designed to "promote better lawmaking" and "serve the purposes of deliberative government." 2 But
Vermeule suggests two reasons for skepticism about such proposals.
First, even if all judges used the same interpretive methods, Congress's
responsiveness to those methods is itself an empirical question on
which people have little reliable information (pp 133-34, 199). Second,
and more interestingly, even if we could safely assume that Congress
would respond in salutary ways if a large group of judges consistently
enforced a particular set of canons, this assumption is largely irrelevant
to the calculus that an individual judge should use when selecting interpretive methods (pp 121-23). Unless the judge sits on the Supreme
Court, whatever canons he personally adopts are extremely unlikely to
affect how Congress legislates; any realistic mechanism for that effect
requires some critical mass of judges, and no individual federal judge
can force his colleagues to coordinate on a particular methodology. In
Vermeule's view, indeed, even the Supreme Court cannot realistically
secure coordination on particular democracy-forcing rules, because
those rules tend to have political valences that work to defeat the necessary consensus." Vermeule concludes that canons designed "to provoke desirable legislative responses" are unlikely to work; they will
generate extra decision costs but no predictable benefits (p 198).
11 Quoting Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 345,
346. But see Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 Harv L Rev 2420, 2421 (2006) (undertaking "a
comprehensive review of the Rehnquist Court's application of the rule of lenity" and concluding
that "the application of the rule was neither random nor unprincipled").
12 Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 413,
457-59,476-89 (1989).
13 According to Vermeule, different justices are likely to have sufficiently different views to
prevent the Court as a whole from acting with a single mind (p 131), and any temporary coalition
might fall apart before the Court encountered statutes enacted in response to it (p 128). To make
matters worse, most questions of statutory interpretation never make it up to the Supreme
Court, and the extent to which certiorari review generates uniformity among lower courts is
another empirical question on which we have insufficient data (p 130).
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Vermeule is also skeptical of canons designed to reflect Congress's existing patterns of behavior and to encourage judges to answer interpretive questions in light of those patterns. Such canons rest
on the premise that when a statutory provision could be interpreted in
either of two ways, one of which is consistent with Congress's established patterns and the other of which is not, Congress is more likely
to have intended the former meaning than the latter. Vermeule contends, however, that the "informational value" of these canons is relatively low; because the canons are "generic," they cannot "speak directly to the particulars of the interpretive problem at hand," and they
therefore cannot offer great insight into what members of the enacting Congress were really thinking (pp 199-200). Although Vermeule
concedes that "the costs of using the canons are plausibly small," he
argues that the benefits are small too, and that "the benefits are far
more conjectural than the costs" (p 200).
Vermeule also discourages judges from trying to shed light on the
meaning of one statute by considering other, related statutes-a standard technique for textualists and purposivists alike, but one that
Vermeule believes "often fails cost-benefit analysis" (pp 202-03). Having to identify and consider these "comparison texts" unquestionably
takes time. The time that judges and law clerks spend "searching out
and comparing usage across the whole Code or within a database"
leaves them with less time for "considering directly relevant texts in
other cases" (p 204); the time that lawyers spend in similar pursuits
translates into higher fees for their clients. The marginal costs of consulting these "collateral sources" can therefore be significant (pp 20304). In Vermeule's opinion, however, the marginal benefits tend to be
low: "The most important common feature of other statutes is that
they are not the statute before the Court, and any information they
supply will be at best collateral or low-value" (p 205). Indeed, to the
extent that judges misinterpret the comparison texts that they consider, the practice of considering such texts may actually be counterproductive, and Vermeule sees "no particular reason to think that the
illuminating effect of holistic textualism will predominate over its error-producing effect" (pp 204-05). Given the certain costs and the uncertain benefits of paying attention to related statutes, Vermeule advises
judges to consider only the statute that they are trying to interpret.
Vermeule does not stop there. He would have judges limit themselves to "the directly dispositive clauses or provisions at hand" and
not seek guidance even from other provisions in the same statute
(p 204). Vermeule defends this startling idea on his usual grounds. In
his view, the benefits of having judges consider the statute as a whole
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are quite uncertain; while Vermeule trusts interpreters within specialist agencies to draw fairly accurate conclusions about how different
provisions of a statute fit together, he does not think that generalist
judges can use this technique so well. The more sources judges consider, though, the greater their decision costs.
In the end, Vermeule uses sophisticated-sounding tools to reach a
crude-sounding conclusion: judges should interpret each statutory
provision according to "its surface or apparent meaning" and not
much else (p 183). When judges can identify such a meaning, they
should never attempt to enrich their understanding by drawing upon
collateral sources; on cost-benefit grounds, judges should abandon the
use of "legislative history, many of the canons of construction, and
holistic textual comparison" (p 183). Indeed, judges should not use
these tools even when they confront questions that a statute's surface
meaning does not answer, but that nonetheless lie within the statute's
domain. As we shall see, Vermeule's principal suggestion for such
cases is that judges should defer to the interpretation of administrative
agencies. But if there is no agency in the picture, courts still should not
engage in "complex interpretation" (pp 214-15). Instead of trying to
maximize their accuracy rates (subject to the side constraint that the
interpretive process should not be wildly expensive), courts should
strive to minimize decision costs (subject to the side constraint that the
interpretive process should not be wildly inaccurate).
C. Administrative Agencies and Institutional Choice
Although Vermeule encourages federal judges to simplify their
interpretive techniques dramatically, he does not give the same advice
to interpreters in federal administrative agencies. In keeping with his
belief that decisionmakers in different institutions tend to have different capacities, he tentatively suggests that agencies can productively
use many of the very techniques that he urges judges to abandon.
In Vermeule's view, for instance, "[s]pecialist agencies ... are far

better positioned to comprehend the complex legislative histories of
their particular statutes than are generalist judges" (p 215). For one
thing, they have the luxury of being able to delve more deeply into the
available materials; while judges cannot possibly read all the committee
reports and floor debates associated with each statute they encounter,
agency interpreters confront a smaller set of statutes and can become
quite familiar with the relevant records. In addition, they may have a
better feel for the legislative process and a better grasp of any relevant technical issues (p 209).
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Interpreters in administrative agencies may also be better positioned than judges to use other statutory provisions to shed light on
the one being interpreted (p 205). Being immersed in the relevant
area of law already, they may be quite efficient at identifying provisions
that are in pari materia, and their understanding of how those provisions fit together may be more reliable than the typical nonspecialist's.
To the extent that administrative interpreters can conduct intertextual
comparisons more cheaply and accurately than judges can, costbenefit analysis might lead them to retain this tool even if judges
should discard it.
Just as agency interpreters may be better positioned than judges
to engage in these forms of complex interpretation, so too they may
be better positioned to fill whatever gaps their interpretive methods
identify. When choosing among different constructions, agency decisionmakers are likely to know more than generalist judges about the
probable consequences of each. As compared to the life-tenured federal judiciary, agencies are also "systematically more responsive and
accountable" to the political process (p 210). Thus, both technocratic
and democratic ideals arguably favor giving agencies rather than
courts primary responsibility for the policy judgments that the resolution of ambiguities sometimes requires.
For these and other reasons, there is one judicial canon that Vermeule very much likes (and wants to expand considerably): the presumption that when Congress commits the administration of a statutory provision to a particular federal agency, Congress is implicitly
authorizing the agency to interpret the provision's language in a way
that binds later courts. As the Supreme Court formulated this canon in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc," re-

viewing courts must accept the agency's reading on any matter as to
which (1) the statutory provision is "silent or ambiguous" and (2) the
agency has supplied a "permissible" construction." Not only does
Vermeule embrace this canon wholeheartedly, but he encourages
judges to take an extraordinarily lenient view of both conditions. In
his view, a provision qualifies as "silent or ambiguous" as long as it
contains some gap or ambiguity on its surface; even if the judiciary's
traditional tools of construction would completely eliminate the ambiguity, Vermeule believes that judges should not use those tools to
constrain the agency's interpretive freedom (pp 206, 215). Indeed,
14 467 US 837 (1984).
15 Id at 842-43.
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Vermeule suggests that judges should give agencies considerable leeway to adopt an entirely different interpretive methodology than the
judges themselves would use (pp 212-14). Vermeule also seems to believe that the second step of the Chevron framework should have very
little bite: rather than having courts determine whether the agency's
interpretation is "permissible" by second-guessing the agency's reasoning process, Vermeule would let the agency supply any answer that
does not contradict "clear and specific language[] in the provision
immediately at issue" (pp 224,229).
In addition to boosting the power of Chevron deference, Vermeule would also expand its scope. Under current doctrine, federal
statutes are presumed to give an agency Chevron-style interpretive
authority only with respect to provisions that the agency is in charge
of administering, and agencies are not16 thought to "administer" provisions that are enforced only in court. Vermeule seems inclined to relax or eliminate that limitation. 7 Similarly, Vermeule sharply criticizes

18
the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v Mead Corp,

which declined to accord Chevron deference to interpretations reflected in the Customs Service's tariff classifications.19 Rather than
asking on a statute-by-statute basis whether Congress intends particular agencies to be able to exercise Chevron-style interpretive authority
through mechanisms other than formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking, Vermeule favors a less nuanced default rule:
absent contrary directions from Congress, courts should apply Chevron deference without regard to the procedures that the relevant
agency used to develop its interpretations or the form in which it
chose to express them (pp 215-23).
II.

JUDGING WITHOUT AGENCIES

Vermeule suggests that under his expanded version of Chevron
deference, it will be relatively rare for federal judges to confront questions of statutory interpretation on which no agency's views deserve
deference (p 201). This suggestion, however, is surely exaggerated.
Many important federal statutes create no significant role for agency

16 See Adams FruitCompany, Inc v Barrett,494 US 638,649-50 (1990).
17 For instance, he is sympathetic to Dan Kahan's idea that courts should give Chevron deference to the Justice Department's interpretations of federal criminal statutes (pp 184, 211-12). See
generally Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to FederalCriminalLaw?, 110 Harv L Rev 469 (1996).
18 533 US 218 (2001).
19 Id at 234.
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interpreters." Others address so many different agencies that courts
cannot sensibly defer to any single agency's position; for instance, even
Vermeule concedes that courts must interpret the Administrative Procedure Act on their own (p 217)." Before considering the proper allo-

cation of interpretive authority between courts and agencies, I will
therefore raise a few questions about the approach that Vermeule
would have judges take when no agency is in the picture.
A. How Far Does Our "Severe Uncertainty" Really Extend?
Vermeule's argument for jettisoning many of the traditional tools
of statutory construction rests on the premise that we face "severe
uncertainty" about the practical consequences of a judge's use of
those tools; for all we know, the tools are just as likely to worsen the
judge's results as to improve them. In support of this claim, Vermeule
points to the "stalemate of empirical intuitions" between today's textualists and today's purposivists. But that stalemate probably does not
reach as far as Vermeule's thesis requires.
It may well be true that the current state of human knowledge
does not permit us to make an informed choice between textualism
and purposivism; even if we could agree upon the high-level goals that
we want the judiciary's methods of statutory interpretation to serve,
we might still face severe uncertainty about whether the typical judge
would better promote those goals by gravitating toward textualism or
by gravitating toward purposivism. As Vermeule suggests, moreover,
we might sensibly react to this uncertainty by favoring the approach
that will be cheaper to implement; if textualism entails fewer decision
costs than purposivism, that would be a reason to prefer textualism
over purposivism. But one cannot automatically use this logic to support an even cheaper third alternative, which uses a more restricted
interpretive palette than either textualism or purposivism, unless the

20
See, for example, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 1 et seq (2000); the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 USC § 101 et seq (2000); most of the Copyright Act, 17 USC § 101 et seq (2000); and
the Judicial Code, 28 USC § 1 et seq (2000).
21 For other examples, see the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552 (2000); the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 USC App 2 (2000); the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
USC § 4321 et seq (2000); and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 USC § 2000bb et seq
(2000). See generally Stephen G. Breyer et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 270-71
(Aspen 6th ed 2006) ("An agency does not receive deference if it is interpreting a statute that is
enforced by many agencies."); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
Georgetown L J 833, 893 (2001) (noting the universal acceptance of the principle that Chevron
does not reach statutes that apply to "all or virtually all administrative agencies").
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uncertainty to which one is reacting reaches this alternative as well.
Vermeule's approach probably does not satisfy that condition.
To make this criticism more concrete, suppose one shares the
commonly held view that judges should try to identify some version of
the "intended meaning" of statutory language. As Vermeule notes,
different theorists disagree about whether textualist or purposivist
methods will bring judges closer to this high-level goal. The same
stalemate of empirical intuitions might extend to the choice between
purposivism and Vermeule's proposed alternative. But it does not extend to the choice between textualism and Vermeule's proposal. To the
contrary, nearly everyone engaged in the current debate is likely to
share the intuition that judges who use standard textualist methods will
come closer to the intended meaning of statutory language than judges
who use Vermeule's approach. Textualists themselves will require little
persuasion on this point. As for purposivists, they are likely to regard
Vermeule's emphasis on "surface meaning" as being even cruder and
more error-prone than the textualist methods that they criticize.
Even if I am right about people's likely intuitions, of course, this
consensus would not threaten Vermeule's argument if we could dismiss it as unfounded. But notwithstanding all the gaps in our empirical
knowledge, I doubt that there really is "severe uncertainty" about
whether judges will grasp the intended meaning of a statute better if
they read the statute as a whole than if they focus exclusively on the
one provision most immediately at hand. Likewise, I see little reason
to think that there is severe uncertainty about whether canons that are
designed to reflect Congress's established patterns of behavior will be
better guides to the intended meaning of statutory language than canons whose content is picked at random. Although the contrarian possibilities that Vermeule raises on these points may be conceivable,
they seem distinctly improbable-and Vermeule himself has no objection to basing interpretive choices upon what the available information genuinely identifies as the probabilities." It seems probable, then,
that judges will do a better job of capturing the intended meaning of
statutory language if they use standard forms of textualism than if
they adopt Vermeule's even more minimalist alternative.2
As Vermeule puts it in a different context, to refuse to act upon any such assessments "is
22
to cross the indistinct but real boundary between laudable agnosticism and debilitating skepticism" (p 215).
To avoid misunderstanding, I should make clear the limits of what I have just said. The
23
argument that I have just advanced does not purport to establish that all judges should be textualists; I have said nothing about the choice between textualism and purposivism. But the argument does suggest that judges who care about identifying the intended meaning of statutory
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To What Extent Do the Claimed Benefits of Vermeule's
Approach Require Coordination?

Even though Vermeule's approach can be expected to yield less
accurate results than more familiar methods of interpretation, it might
still be attractive if it reduced "decision costs" enough. But I am skeptical that individual judges could generate any significant savings by
adopting Vermeule's approach. Meaningful reduction of decision costs
would require precisely the sort of coordinated action that Vermeule
does not think the judiciary can attain.
Vermeule himself anticipates this objection and rejects it; he argues that individual judges can use his strategy to reduce decision
costs regardless of what other judges do (p 226). That is true up to a
point-individual judges who use Vermeule's strategy might indeed
spend somewhat less time than other judges on the questions of statutory interpretation they confront. To be sure, the time that they free
up in this way cannot necessarily be used to process more cases. (Under the methods that most federal courts currently use to assign cases
to judges, individual judges usually cannot get more cases to decide
than their colleagues.) But judges who use Vermeule's approach may
have more time either to play golf or to analyze the nonstatutory issues in their cases.
Still, these time savings are likely to be fairly small. Even judges
who are willing to consider legislative history or related provisions in
other statutes do not usually conduct unguided searches for this information; they read briefs submitted by the parties and they follow
the citations that the parties have provided. From the judge's perspective, then, it need not take a great deal of time to consider arguments
based on legislative history or statutes in parimateria.

Of course, those arguments are not costless to produce; while
judges can piggyback on the efforts of the parties' lawyers, the lawyers
themselves cannot. But even if lawyers were trying to present judges
only with arguments about "the statutory ... provisions directly appli-

cable in the case at hand" (p 204), they would have to read all of the
statutes that might contain such provisions. In the course of trying to
identify the "provisions immediately at hand" (p 184), they would inevitably come across at least some of the sources that distinguish
standard forms of textualism from Vermeule's approach (such as other
language should not be Vermeulians. Even if the stalemate of empirical intuitions afflicts both
the choice between textualism and purposivism and the choice between purposivism and Vermeule's approach, the transitive property does not apply: everyone's empirical intuitions are
likely to favor standard forms of textualism over Vermeule's approach.
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provisions in the same statute and statutes in pari materia).The marginal cost of calling those sources to the judges' attention seems fairly
low. Thus, Vermeule's approach may not be substantially cheaper for
the legal system to implement than standard forms of textualism.
Vermeule's approach might seem to promise greater savings
when compared to approaches that emphasize the use of legislative
history. After all, if lawyers believe that arguments about legislative
history might help them win their case, and if winning the case is sufficiently valuable to their clients, they are likely to do some costly research that they would not choose to do if all judges used Vermeule's
approach. If Vermeule is correct that research of this sort does not
predictably improve the accuracy of the legal system's results, moreover, then the resulting legal fees-while worthwhile from the clients'
perspective-may well represent a loss for society as a whole.
Importantly, however, an individual federal judge's decision to
embrace Vermeule's approach would not necessarily avoid this loss in
any given case. Individual circuit judges, in particular, are in a terrible
position to save the parties any substantial research costs. Not only
will the parties already have done much of the necessary research at
the district court level, but the parties typically must submit their appellate briefs before they know which circuit judges will sit on their
panel." Even if one of the judges on the panel has embraced Vermeule's approach, moreover, the parties will be trying to win the votes
of the other judges too. For that very reason, indeed, an individual circuit judge's decision to adopt Vermeule's novel approach might marginally increase the litigation costs that society incurs, because some
parties would find it advantageous to address both the application of
more traditional interpretive methods and the application of Vermeule's approach.2
At least when no administrative agency is in the picture, then,
Vermeule's proposed approach does not seem very attractive. An individual judge who embraces Vermeule's emphasis on the "surface ...
meaning" of "the statutory text directly at hand" (p 183) seems likely to
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., and Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the
24
Court of Appeals, 78 Tex L Rev 1037, 1075-78 (2000) (reporting when each circuit conveys information about panel composition to litigants).
Individual district judges might be in a somewhat better position than individual circuit
25
judges to cause the parties to economize on research costs. But the coordination problem will
still have at least some effect. Even if the district judge who is assigned to a case makes clear that
she will ignore all arguments based on legislative history and other collateral sources, the parties'
lawyers might research such sources anyway, both to determine their prospects on appeal and to
preserve arguments that a panel of circuit judges might find persuasive.
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reach less accurate results (on any plausible version of accuracy) than a
judge who uses standard forms of textualism. If Vermeule is correct
about the judiciary's low capacity for coordination, moreover, this loss
of accuracy seems unlikely to be offset by a substantial reduction in
decision costs- especially when one compares Vermeule's approach to
textualism, and perhaps even when one compares it to purposivism.
III. DOES CHEVRON CONQUER ALL?
Even if Vermeule is wrong to steer judges away from all forms of
"complex interpretation" when no agency is in the picture, the real
focus of his book is the interpretive techniques that judges should apply to statutory provisions that a specialist agency has already construed. In particular, Vermeule is interested in the relationship between Chevron deference and what the Chevron Court called the
"traditional tools of statutory construction""- in other words, the
tools traditionally used by courts to determine statutory meaning.
When a statutory provision seems ambiguous on its face, but an established canon of construction would resolve the ambiguity, how should
reviewing courts decide whether the relevant agency can ignore the
canon? What if the agency's construction does not offend any established canons, but conflicts with the available legislative history or the
apparent purpose behind related statutory provisions? When reviewing courts apply the Chevron framework, which interpretive tools
should they use to narrow the range of meanings from among which
the agency can choose, and which interpretive tools should they permit agencies to discard?
Although these questions are central to the practical operation of
Chevron deference, which in turn has become one of the cornerstones
of federal administrative law, the Supreme Court has given them almost no sustained attention. Even the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, whose administrative-law opinions in the two
decades after Chevron have often been more sophisticated than those
of the Supreme Court, has shed relatively little light on the interaction
between Chevron deference and other interpretive principles. The
relationship between Chevron deference and the canons, for instance,
''
"
remains "one of the most uncertain aspects of the Chevron doctrine.
26

Chevron,467 US at 843 n 9.

Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va L Rev 649, 675 (2000).
For surveys of the confused case law on such matters, see Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception
to Chevron Deference, 58 Baylor L Rev 1,41-47 (2006) (discussing a three-way circuit split about
"how Chevron interacts with the rule of lenity"); Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of Con27
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With a few notable exceptions, 8 moreover, legal scholars have spent
little time trying to dispel the uncertainty. Vermeule therefore deserves
great credit for focusing attention on these important questions.
The answer that he proposes, however, is too extreme to be very
plausible. According to Vermeule, "courts should defer to agencies
whenever the statutory text at issue, viewed on its face and without
recourse to the traditional tools, contains a surface-level gap or ambiguity" (p 211). Even if the ambiguity would vanish if interpreters simply read other provisions of the same statute or applied some widely
recognized canon that reflects Congress's established patterns, Vermeule does not want reviewing courts to use such techniques to restrict the relevant agency's interpretive freedom. Vermeule draws no
distinctions among the "traditional tools of statutory construction,"
and he believes that Chevron deference should trump them all.
As Vermeule is well aware, of course, even to identify the "surface-level" meaning of a statutory provision requires attention to
some set of linguistic conventions (pp 43-44, 188), such as the conventions about vocabulary and grammar that were widely considered part
of American English at the time the provision was enacted. When Vermeule urges judges to deemphasize the traditional tools of statutory
construction, he is not talking about the "fundamental canon" that
interpreters should usually give statutory language its "common
meaning"9-the meaning that it would have in what the Supreme

Court calls "ordinary English."' By and large, the tools that he wants
to deemphasize are the ones that apply specifically to the interpretation of statutes (rather than English prose in general).
For people whose view of the high-level goals of statutory interpretation pays some attention to congressional intent, those tools fall
into two broad categories. Some of the traditional tools of statutory
struction v. The Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the
Ambiguous Problem, 37 Conn L Rev 495, 543-56 (2004) (noting the similar split about whether
the canon of construing federal statutes in favor of Indian tribes trumps Chevron deference); Brian
G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 Georgetown Immig L J 515,
543-59 (2003) (concluding more generally that "courts have not attempted to formulate a jurisprudence that would resolve the conflict between substantive canons and Chevron deference").
28 The leading commentator to address the interpretive principles that should and should
not trump Chevron deference is Professor Sunstein, who has developed his thoughts on this issue
in a series of articles. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What
the Law Is, 115 Yale L J 2580,2607-10 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi
L Rev 315, 330-37 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum L
Rev 2071, 2105-19 (1990). Useful commentary on Professor Sunstein's analysis appears in Nina
A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,102 Mich L Rev 737,748-52 (2004).
29
Perrin v United States, 444 US 37,42 (1979).
30
US Airways, Inc v Barnett,535 US 391,399 (2002).
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construction, such as so-called descriptive canons, are designed to
minimize gaps between the directives that judges understand statutes
to establish and the directives that members of the enacting Congress
understood themselves to be enacting; they are aimed at identifying
the intended meaning of statutory language. Others, such as so-called
normative canons, are designed to guide judges when the available
information about intended meaning has run out-when the judges'
primary interpretive tools have succeeded only in identifying a range
of possible meanings, none of which seems significantly more likely
than the others to reflect what members of the enacting legislature
probably had in mind."
At least before Vermeule's book, courts and commentators alike
assumed that most of the interpretive techniques in the first category
should trump Chevron deference, in the sense that judges can properly
use them to narrow the range of interpretations from which the relevant administrative agency can choose." Although Vermeule's contrary suggestion requires us to take a fresh look at this issue, Part
III.A concludes that the conventional wisdom should survive his arguments. Part III.B then considers whether any of the interpretive
techniques in the second category should also be capable of trumping
Chevron deference. Part III.C discusses Vermeule's broader ideas
about the relationship between Chevron deference and an agency's
choice of interpretive method.

31 See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand L Rev 561,563 (1992) (discussing the distinction between descriptive and normative canons).
32
See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2105, 2109-10 (cited in note 28) (concluding that
"Chevron is plainly overcome by principles that help to ascertain congressional instructions").
See also Bradley, 86 Va L Rev at 675 (cited in note 27) ("[T]he Court regularly applies textoriented canons in determining whether Congress has spoken to an issue under Step One of
Chevron."); Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 745 (cited in note 28) ("Despite Chevron, for example, courts generally have applied rules of syntax in preference to agency interpretations."). For
recent applications of text-based canons to restrict agencies' interpretive freedom, see National
Credit Union Administration v FirstNationalBank & Trust Co, 522 US 479,501-02 (1998) (presumption of consistent usage); United States v Cooper, 396 F3d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir 2005) (presumption against superfluity); California Independent System Operator Corp v FERC, 372 F3d
395,400 (DC Cir 2004) (noscitura sociis); City of Tacoma, Washington v FERC, 331 F3d 106, 115
(DC Cir 2003) (construction of statutes in pari materia). For similar applications of descriptive
canons designed to reflect Congress's established patterns of behavior, see INS v St Cyr, 533 US
289, 320 n 45 (2001) (presumption against retroactivity); ABA v FTC, 430 F3d 457,472 (DC Cir
2005) (presumption that Congress does not intend to regulate areas that it has traditionally left
to the states); California State Board of Optometry v FTC, 910 F2d 976, 980-82 (DC Cir 1990)
(presumption that Congress does not intend to regulate the states as sovereigns).
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Chevron and Interpretive Tools Designed to Identify a
Statute's Intended Meaning

The standard defense of Chevron deference starts from the premise that statutes do not have determinate meanings on each and every
legal issue within their domain, and asks whether the legal system will
work better if primary responsibility for filling gaps and resolving ambiguities lies with judges or with decisionmakers in a specialist
agency.33 As compared to generalist judges, agency decisionmakers are
likely to have more experience in the relevant field, better information about problems that need solving, and a better sense for the practical consequences of various possible rules. Agency decisionmakers
also are subject to more effective presidential control than lifetenured judges, and they interact more regularly with the relevant

congressional committees and staffs; assuming that it is desirable for
interpreters to pay some attention to current political preferences
when resolving ambiguities in statutory language, many agency decisionmakers are probably better positioned than the typical federal

33
Of course, to the extent that Congress has already confronted and resolved this policy
question, interpreters would not have to address it for themselves. The rule articulated in Chevron is commonly described in just these terms, as a presumption about how Congress intends to
allocate interpretive authority between courts and agencies. But scholars agree that this presumption is largely fictional. At least before Chevron was in place, there was no more reason to
believe that Congress typically understood its statutes to delegate interpretive authority to administrative agencies than that Congress typically understood its statutes to leave all such authority in judges' hands. With respect to most enactments, indeed, members of Congress probably formed no understanding on this issue at all. The Chevron canon therefore cannot plausibly
be defended as an estimation of some preexisting legislative intent. See David J. Barron and
Elena Kagan, Chevron'sNondelegation Doctrine,2001 S Ct Rev 201,212-25.
It does not follow that judges who care about the effectuation of congressional intent should
reject Chevron deference. Even if Congress has not spoken to this issue, judges reviewing the
administration of federal statutes need to figure out how much to defer to the relevant agency's
interpreters. In the absence of contrary direction from Ce, ress, judges could make the necessary decisions on a statute-by-statute or provision-by-prex ision basis, without any guiding presumption. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
Duke L J 511, 516-17 (asserting that this is precisely what iie Supreme Court did before Chevron). In the face of consistent congressional silence or ambiguity about the allocation of interpretive authority, however, members of the Supreme Court could sensibly conclude that a broader
presumption would generate more predictable decisions without frustrating any genuine legislative intent. Id. In setting the presumption's content, moreover, they could legitimately rely upon
their own normative judgments about the circumstances in which agencies are likely to do a
better job than judges at resolving ambiguities in statutory language. As discussed more fully in
Part III.B, canons that formalize such normative judgments are a common response to issues that
the judiciary must confront when applying federal statutes, but on which Congress has provided
little or no guidance.
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judge to do so.' To be sure, specialist agencies might be more prone
than generalist judges to harmful forms of tunnel vision (or, on some
accounts, to capture by regulated industries). On balance, though, both
their greater expertise and their greater responsiveness to the political
branches arguably give them a sounder basis than courts for many
types of discretionary judgments.
Notably, this standard defense of Chevron does not claim that
agencies will systematically be better than courts at discerning a statute's intended meaning. It focuses, instead, on the resolution of matters that the enacting Congress left obscure-gaps and ambiguities as
to which the statute has no single discernible intended meaning. The
argument that agencies have more expertise in their specialized fields
does spill over to affect a few of the techniques that judges sometimes
use to glean intended meaning: courts should give considerable deference to a specialist agency's understanding of terms of art, and courts
also should hesitate to conclude that an interpretation endorsed by
the relevant agency is likely to produce such absurd results that Congress must have meant something else.3 By and large, though, Chevron
deference is less about the determination of a statute's intended
meaning than about the exercise of discretionary judgment within the
zone in which courts deem that meaning unclear. That is why, on the
standard account, courts are free to use descriptive canons (and other
traditional techniques for discerning intended meaning) at Step One
of the Chevron process.
In criticizing this aspect of current practice, Vermeule argues that
agencies are better positioned than courts not only to make discretionary judgments in their fields of specialty but also to identify the
judgments that Congress has already made. As he notes, "[a]gencies
will often possess far better information about the legislative process
that produced the statute, about the specialized policy context surrounding the statute's enactment, and about the resulting legislative
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev
34
2027,2126-59 (2002) (defending Chevron on this basis). See also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron- The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 821,824 (1990) (tracing Chevron to
"the sound premise that agencies enjoy a comparative institutional advantage as a matter of
legitimacy in resolving ambiguities in legislation they are charged with administering" because
"Congress and the President have a great deal more continuing influence over those agencies
than over the judiciary").
35
See Peter S.Heinecke, Comment, Chevron and the Canon Favoring Indians, 60 U Chi L
Rev 1015, 1023 (1993) ("One of the motivating factors behind Chevron deference is that agencies have greater expertise; they presumably know better than courts what constitutes an 'absurd' result.").
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deal" (p 209). Largely because of their superior information about
what members of the enacting Congress had in mind, Vermeule suggests that agencies need not resort to the tools of construction that
courts have developed for their own use, such as generic canons or
inferences drawn from related statutes in the same field. If reviewing
courts nonetheless use those tools to invalidate an agency's interpretation, the courts might well be driving the legal system's results away
from the statute's true intended meaning; according to Vermeule,
there is great uncertainty about "[whether] judicial resort to the traditional interpretive tools produces better accounts of original legislative intentions ...than does judicial deference to agencies" (p 210).

But while no one can know whether judges tend to help or hurt when
they engage in complex forms of interpretation over and above the
interpretive work that agencies have already done, this practice
plainly does add to the legal system's "decision costs" (p 210). Vermeule concludes that reviewing courts therefore should not invalidate
agency interpretations for failure to conform to the traditional tools of
construction. As long as the agency's interpretation does not conflict
with the surface meaning of the particular provision at hand, reviewing courts should simply accept it "without consideration of legislative
history, holistic textual comparison to collateral provisions, or other
tools" (pp 227-28).'
The critical premise of this argument-that agencies are likely to
have better information than courts about the intended meaning of
particular statutes-may well be correct. For one thing, lawyers from
the relevant agency often work with Congress on regulatory legislation ,7 and those lawyers might well emerge from the legislative process with a good feel for the compromises that members of Congress
understood themselves to be striking. But if one accepts standard
36 In addition to claiming that this proposal will reduce the legal system's overall "decision
costs," Vermeule suggests an additional reason to discourage judges from using the traditional
tools of statutory construction in this context: "Where canons of various sorts, legislative history
with its high volume and internal heterogeneity, and indeed the whole enacted code are all in the
judicial kit-bag waiting to be used, agencies and other actors will find it difficult to predict what
the eventual fate of an agency interpretation will be" (p 210). If one accepts Vermeule's own
arguments, however, this point should not really persuade any individual judge to embrace Vermeule's proposal. Even if it is possible for a single judge to make an incremental contribution to
the predictability of the legal system (as Vermeule asserts but does not explain (p 226)), this
incremental contribution cannot be expected to produce any positive effects in the real world.
For the reasons laid out by Vermeule himself, neither agencies nor other actors are likely to alter
their behavior in any discernible way simply because an additional federal judge has embraced
Vermeule's proposed approach.
37
See Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 749-50 (cited in note 28).
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views of the high-level goals of statutory interpretation, one will not
actually want interpreters to rely upon this sort of inside information;
on the standard account, the search for the intended meaning of statutory language is tempered by the desire for interpreters to rely only
upon information available to the public at large.m Perhaps for that
reason, the Supreme Court has specifically refused to base Chevron
deference on the premise that an agency's role during the enactment
of a statute gives the agency special insight into the statute's intended
meaning."
Admittedly, specialist agencies may also be better than courts at
processing the information about intended meaning that is publicly
available. To the extent that related statutory provisions shed light on
the provision being interpreted, for example, agency lawyers may be
better positioned than generalist judges to draw the right inferences.,°
But even if judges would have lower accuracy rates than agency lawyers if both were forced to interpret statutes entirely on their own, it
does not follow that judges should embrace Vermeule's proposal. After all, judges applying Chevron deference are not proceeding on their
own; they have the benefit of the views of a specialist agency, and they
will give substantial deference to those views even if they also take
account of the traditional tools of statutory construction. For purposes
of assessing Vermeule's proposal, the key question is whether it would
be desirable for judges to give even more deference to agency interpretations and to cut the traditional tools of statutory construction out
of the process entirely.
Although no one can possibly develop empirical data on this
question, my own strong intuition is that the legal system as a whole
will do a worse job of capturing the intended meaning of statutory
language if judges adopt Vermeule's proposal than if judges allow the
traditional tools of statutory construction to temper their deference to
agencies. Unless an agency is impermissibly relying upon inside inforThat is one reason why judges interpreting federal statutes do not consider testimony from
legislators who participated in the enactment process. See Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 359 (cited in note 3).
39 See Smiley v Citibank (SD), NA, 517 US 735, 740-41 (1996). See also Michael Herz,
Deference Running Riot: SeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 Admin L J
Am U 187, 194 (1992) (agreeing that "[alithough this justification for deference has a lengthy
pedigree, it is not the theory that underlies Chevron").
I leave aside judges who are themselves specialists in the field of law that the agency
40
administers. As Judge Posner has suggested, there is little reason to think that decisionmakers
within the Securities and Exchange Commission have a better sense of how the federal securities
laws are supposed to interact than Chief Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, or that lawyers within the Patent and Trademark Office have a better understanding of intellectual property
law than Judge Leval of the Second Circuit. See Posner, 101 Mich L Rev at 964 (cited in note 1).
38
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mation, the techniques that the agency uses to determine a statute's
intended meaning are likely to resemble the traditional tools used by
courts themselves. Under current versions of Chevron deference,
moreover, judges will not reject the agency's interpretation simply
because the agency has used those tools better than the judges could
have done on their own; if the agency uses its expertise to figure out
the relationship between the provision at hand and other statutory
provisions, the mere fact that reviewing courts might not have understood that relationship without the agency's guidance will not cause
them to throw out the agency's interpretation. For that matter, judges
who care about the traditional tools of statutory construction will not
necessarily reject an agency's interpretation simply because the
agency has decided not to apply one of those tools in a particular case,
if the agency has provided a sensible explanation for that decision.
Instead, judges applying the current version of Chevron deference are
likely to reject an agency's interpretation only when the agency has
been unable to explain its position in a way that makes sense to them.
Assuming that federal judges are reasonably skilled lawyers even
though they are generalists, I strongly suspect that they will have
higher accuracy rates than agency lawyers in this set of cases-that is,

the set of cases in which judges who have reviewed the agency's position, and who have assessed it in light of both the traditional tools of
statutory construction and the explanations offered by the agency itself, have concluded that the agency's interpretation goes beyond the
zone of discretion permitted by Chevron.
Even though this claim rests on "empirical intuitions" and conventional wisdom rather than hard data, and even though its accuracy
is therefore uncertain, I am not persuaded that the uncertainty is severe enough to warrant invoking the principle of insufficient reason.
Perhaps Vermeule is correct that judges should not reject agency interpretations on the basis of some commonly used tools, such as legislative history; people's empirical intuitions may genuinely be stalemated about whether judicial use of legislative history in this context
is likely to help or hurt. But there is no similar stalemate about
whether courts reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute
should be willing to consider other provisions in the same statute or
sensible descriptive canons -especially when the relevant agency has
no apparent reason for neglecting these tools. Here, the very originality of Vermeule's thesis is a strike against his conclusion: no one other
than Vermeule seems to believe that when federal judges use these
tools to conclude that an agency's interpretation goes beyond the zone
of discretion conferred by Congress, the possibility that the tools will
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affirmatively lead the judges into error completely counterbalances
the possibility of any benefits. Unless that condition is satisfied, however, the traditional tools have a positive expected value in the hands
of reviewing courts-which would defeat Vermeule's argument.
To the extent that one wants the legal system to enforce the intended meaning of statutory language (on matters as to which such
meaning exists), there is another reason to be wary of Vermeule's
proposal. If a critical mass of judges were to embrace Vermeule's approach, agency decisionmakers would face less risk of reversal, and
they might be expected to react by expanding the set of interpretations that they consider adopting." As a result, even if agency decisions currently reflect the intended meaning of statutory language
better than court decisions can, widespread relaxation of the constraints on agency interpretations might change this calculus. In an
odd way, then, Vermeule's analysis has a self-defeating character: the
more judges Vermeule persuades, the more his approach risks producing systemic effects that would undercut his arguments.
B.

Which Normative Canons Should Chevron Deference Trump?

Even if reviewing courts should not permit administrative agencies to thumb their noses at descriptive canons and other traditional
techniques for determining the intended meaning of statutory language, normative canons might well be different. Indeed, scholars
sometimes suggest that unless Chevron deference trumps at least
some such canons, it does not really exist at all, because reviewing
courts would use the canons to eliminate all of the ambiguities that
Chevron might otherwise permit administrative agencies to resolve. 2
This argument is overstated; the set of recognized canons is not nearly
comprehensive enough to resolve all potential ambiguities in statutory
language, and in any event reviewing courts could require an agency
to take account of particular canons while simultaneously giving considerable deference to the agency's judgments about the proper appli41 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187,189 n 3 (2006) ("[A]gencies
and their lawyers are likely to adjust their own practices to deference doctrines ... and take legal
risks that they would not assume if courts were less likely to defer.").
42
See, for example, Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 746 (cited in note 28) ("[I]ncorporating
substantive canons into Step One implies the survival of the Chevron doctrine. Chevron does not
actually survive this approach, however, because when it is taken, the substantive canon will
always dictate the result."). Vermeule gestures in the same direction, saying that when a court
"draw[s] upon the traditional tools to decide whether there is a gap for the agency to fill," it "in
effect reads agency deference out of the picture by narrowing agencies' gap-filling power to the
residual area in which judicial tools run out" (p 206).
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cation of those canons. Still, if one accepts the underlying rationale of
Chevron deference, there are good reasons for reviewing courts to let
agencies entirely disregard at least some of the normative canons that
judges would apply in the agencies' absence.
In order to approach this issue, we must first understand exactly
why courts might apply normative canons when no agency is in the
picture. Even if a court cares deeply about trying to identify and enforce the intended meaning of statutory language, the interpretive
tools that the court uses for this purpose will not resolve every single
question that the statute authorizes interpreters to answer; the court
will inevitably confront issues that come within the statute's domain
but that Congress has not authoritatively answered in an intelligible
way. Courts could try to handle all such gaps and ambiguities in statutory language on an entirely ad hoc basis, so that the answers they
supply for one statute have no bearing on the answers they supply for
any other statute. With respect to certain issues, however, courts interested in a more rule-like approach have articulated broader canons or
presumptions that they proceed to apply across a range of different
statutes. These rules are classified as "normative" canons because their
content typically reflects some normative judgments, such as the relevant court's own sense of what makes for good policy,3 or the values
that the court imputes to our Constitution or to other aspects of our
legal traditions," or the importance that the court places on promoting
the overall coherence of American law. 5
At least for theorists who emphasize the search for a statute's intended meaning, purely normative canons rank below descriptive
canons in the interpretive hierarchy. According to the common account, normative canons guide the choices that interpreters must
make when they confront a set of possible interpretations, none of
which seems substantially more likely than the others to reflect what
members of Congress understood themselves to be enacting. To de-

43 See, for example, NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490,501 (1979) (describing the canon of constitutional avoidance as "the Court's prudential policy").
44 See, for example, Bell v United States, 349 US 81, 83 (1955) (applying the rule of lenity
and stating that "[i]t may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the
enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment"). See also William
N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593,598 (1992) ("A good many of the substantive canons of
statutory construction are directly inspired by the Constitution.").
45 See, for example, FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120, 143-44 (2000)
(resolving ambiguities in language that Congress enacted in 1938 in such a way as to maximize
its consistency with statutes that Congress enacted much more recently).
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termine whether that condition is satisfied, interpreters should use

their tools for determining intended meaning (including any relevant
descriptive canons) before they resort to normative canons.46 Indeed,
the fact that courts commonly use descriptive canons to help set the

parameters for Chevron deference is simply an application of this
the basis for Chevron deferprinciple; on the conventional 4account,
7
canon.
normative
a
itself
is
ence
The relationship between Chevron deference and other normative canons is thus a subset of a broader question: within the space in
which normative canons matter, how should courts proceed when two
normative canons point in opposite directions? For instance, what
should courts do when a statute lends itself to two possible interpretations, one of which would raise a substantial constitutional question
and the other of which would run contrary to international law?
Should the normative portion of the canon of avoidance48 trump the
9
normative portion of the Charming Betsy canon, or vice versa?
Instead of establishing any firm pecking order among normative
canons, current doctrine encourages courts to approach such conflicts

46 See Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 393-98 (cited in note 3) (discussing the role of normative
canons in an interpretive philosophy that emphasizes fidelity to intended meaning). See also id
at 395 n 143 (discussing hybrid canons such as the presumption against retroactivity, which has
both a descriptive component and a normative component).
47 As noted above, Chevron deference is not conventionally seen as a tool for courts to
identify the intended meaning of statutory language; rather, it is a tool for the legal system as a
whole to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities left by the enacting Congress. This tool, moreover, was
not dictated by Congress itself, but instead was developed by the Supreme Court in response to
Congress's persistent failure to address questions of interpretive authority. See note 33. The
general presumption announced in Chevron-thatwhen Congress entrusts the administration of
a statutory provision to a federal agency, Congress should usually be understood to be letting the
agency take the lead in resolving any indeterminacies in the provision-is thus a paradigmatic
normative canon.
In the years since the Supreme Court articulated this presumption, of course, Chevron deference has become a prominent part of federal administrative law, and one can plausibly assume
that members of Congress now know about it and draft bills in light of it.The version of Chevron
deference that they can be presumed to know, however, is limited to matters on which Congress's intended meaning is unclear. As a result, even if there is a sense in which the presumption
articulated in Chevron is now a descriptive canon (because members of Congress factor it into
their own understanding of the bills that they consider), it still should not trump other descriptive canons.
48 See Catholic Bishop, 440 US at 501 (expressing a preference for interpretations that do
not "give rise to serious constitutional questions").
See Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (endorsing the
49
view that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any
other possible construction remains"). For discussion of the history and development of this
canon, see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:

Rethinking the InterpretiveRole of InternationalLaw, 86 Georgetown L J 479 (1998).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:329

on a statute-by-statute basis and to tailor their resolutions to particular circumstances.'o I am certainly sympathetic to the idea that courts
should try to develop a more rule-like approach, so that the relationship among different canons will be stable across a range of different
statutes. In a peculiar way, however, the very firm rule that Vermeule
proposes for the relationship between Chevron deference and other
normative canons would actually undercut this goal. If, as Vermeule
proposes, reviewing courts systematically allowed Chevron deference
to trump any and all normative canons that the courts might otherwise
apply, then each federal agency would be free to decide for itself
whether to apply those canons with respect to any particular statutory
provision that the agency administers. As a result, the normative canons would lose some of their own rule-like features; from the perspective of the legal system as a whole, they would apply to some statutes
and not others, and the distinction would depend on the discretionary
determinations of individual agencies.
Depending upon what a particular normative canon is designed
to achieve, that result might be perfectly acceptable. For instance,
there are good reasons for Chevron deference to trump normative
canons that appellate courts have articulated simply for the purpose
of promoting uniformity in the lower courts' interpretations of statutes. Drawing upon the work of Peter Strauss,' Vermeule plausibly
suggests that Chevron deference not only is a good substitute for such
canons, but might actually be better than such canons at fostering national uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. If the central
board that sits atop the hierarchy of the typical federal administrative
agency interprets a statute in a particular way, and if judges scattered
throughout the country give considerable deference to its conclusions,
then the statute will have a more "genuinely national" meaning than it
would if the relatively decentralized federal judiciary engaged in more
independent interpretation (p 208)."
50 See, for example, Chickasaw Nation v United States, 534 US 84, 95 (2001) (refusing to
conclude that "the pro-Indian canon" always trumps "the canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed" and
explaining that the Court's precedents "are too individualized, involving too many different kinds
of legal circumstances, to warrant any such assessment about the two canons' relative strength").
51 See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093,
1121 (1987) (arguing that in light of practical limits on the Supreme Court's ability "directly to
enforce uniformity upon the courts of appeals," the Chevron doctrine "enhances the probability
of uniform national administration of the laws").
52
Vermeule himself takes this argument much farther, implicitly treating it as one reason
for Chevron deference to trump all of the canons that courts might otherwise use to limit agen-

2007]

Statutory Interpretationand Decision Theory

Assuming that one accepts Chevron's own rationale, Chevron
deference should also trump normative canons that reflect the Supreme Court's assessment of policy questions specific to the field in
which a particular administrative agency specializes. The logic of Chevron, after all, suggests that agencies are better suited than courts to
take the lead in making such assessments with respect to the statutory
provisions that they administer.
Many normative canons, however, rest on broader policy judgments that go well beyond any single agency's particular specialty. To
the extent that generalist courts are less prone to tunnel vision than
specialist agencies, courts may actually be better positioned to make
those judgments than the typical agency. Figuring out whether Chev-

ron deference should trump normative canons of this sort therefore
requires one to decide what to do when the "expertise" and "political

accountability" rationales for Chevron deference diverge -a question
on which Chevron itself suggests no answer.
By the same token, it is possible for normative canons to be policy-based without resting entirely on policy judgments made by courts.
Some normative canons, although developed and articulated by
cies' interpretive freedom. As Vermeule explains, "centralizing interpretive authority in agencies
reduces the disuniformity of law across judicial circuits and thus reduces the net uncertainty and
decision costs of the interpretive regime" (p 224). This argument, however, cannot really do
much work for Vermeule. To the extent that Vermeule is simply advising individual judges about
the interpretive methods that they should adopt (notwithstanding the fact that other judges will
be using different methods), it is far from clear that a single judge's decision to expand his personal version of Chevron deference can reduce "net uncertainty" in a way that has any practical
impact for the legal system as a whole. Conversely, if a critical mass of judges were able to coordinate on Vermeule's proposal, agencies might well react by pushing the limits of their newfound
interpretive freedoms, presenting reviewing courts with a new set of hard cases that might again
generate circuit splits.
Even if Vermeule's proposal were capable of solving the problem of persistent circuit splits
about the meaning of federal statutes, moreover, that problem might be more of an aesthetic
concern for law professors than a significant drag on the American economy. Companies that do
business nationwide will always have to figure out how to handle geographic differences in the
substance of state law, and they presumably can handle geographic differences in the interpretation of federal law the same way. In any event, the possibility of unresolved circuit splits about
the meaning of federal law is an artifact of the structure that Congress has deliberately chosen
for the federal judiciary, combined with Congress's decision not to require courts in one circuit
to follow precedents of another circuit and not to give district court opinions any formal precedential effect at all. If Congress itself is content with the "balkanization" (p 208) that results from
the judicial structure that Congress has chosen (perhaps on the theory that decentralization has
benefits as well as costs), then the alleged problem identified by Vermeule may not be one that
courts should take it upon themselves to solve.
53 Compare Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v Thornburgh,868 F2d 1285,1292-93
(DC Cir 1989) (concluding that Chevron deference trumps the canon that exemptions to the antitrust laws should be narrowly construed), affd by an equally divided Court, 493 US 38 (1989).
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judges, are designed to guide the resolution of ambiguities toward
outcomes that reflect values gleaned from the federal Constitution or
from our legal system as a whole. It is not clear that even Chevron's
"political accountability" rationale provides strong reason for reviewing courts to let administrative agencies dispense with these canons.
Of course, even if Chevron's own internal logic does not itself
compel reviewing courts to elevate Chevron deference over all other
policy-based normative canons, other institutional considerations might
provide independent reasons for courts to do so. I am not a great fan of
normative canons, and I have no particular stake in where Chevron deference ranks among them. Developing a position on that issue, however, probably requires a more thoroughgoing institutional analysis
than Vermeule provides. While it is possible to speak in general terms
about the structure and institutional capabilities of the federal judiciary,
federal administrative agencies are much more heterogeneous. Different agencies have very different internal structures and are subject to
very different mechanisms for external oversight and control. These
differences affect both how centralized their decisionmaking is and
how much the president and Congress influence it. The kinds of decisions that Congress commits to particular agencies also vary widely,
with the result that technical expertise matters more in some agencies
than in others. Similarly, jobs in different agencies come with different
levels of prestige, with the result that some agencies can attract better
lawyers and higher-powered staffs than others.
Despite all this variability, scholars might still conclude that reviewing courts should take a one-size-fits-all approach to the relationship between Chevron deference and other normative canons; although the variability of agency structures surely increases the costs of
such an approach, the benefits of having a universal rule might still
exceed those costs. But Vermeule does not even sketch out how this
analysis might proceed. Notwithstanding his repeated calls for "a resolutely institutional account" that pays attention to on-the-ground empirical realities (pp 12, 85), he contents himself with broad-gauged
references to the advantages that "agencies" enjoy over "judges." As a
result, he does not really fulfill his claim to establish that sophisticated
institutional analysis, when applied to the current state of our knowledge about all of the entities at work in our legal system, counsels reviewing courts never to use any normative canon to reject any specialist agency's interpretation of a statute.
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Chevron and an Agency's Choice of Interpretive Method

Although Vermeule insists that judges should never use "complex
interpretation" to reject constructions that a specialist agency has embraced, he is not entirely clear about whether judges should ever use
complex interpretation to uphold a specialist agency's construction.
Suppose, for instance, that the surface meaning of a particular statutory provision seems unambiguous, but the relevant agency has embraced a different reading on the strength of one of the traditional
tools of statutory construction; the agency has invoked a canon that
supports reading certain kinds of exceptions into seemingly unqualified statutory language,m or it has detected some hidden ambiguity

generated .by the provision's interaction with other provisions in the
same statute, or it has concluded that a literal reading of the provision
would produce such absurd results that a more flexible interpretation

is warranted. Should reviewing courts reject all such arguments for
deviating from the provision's surface meaning, or can they take account of the traditional tools of construction to recognize the existence
of an ambiguity that the relevant agency is empowered to resolve?
In a gesture at answering this question, Vermeule asserts that
judges should not defer to agencies "where ambiguities are extrinsic
rather than intrinsic" (p 228). But the illustration that he offers-that
judges should not let agencies deviate from "the clear and specific text

of the provision at hand" because of contrary statements in the legislative history (p 228)-is too easy to tell us much about his position.
Even supporters of the use of legislative history do not usually argue

that interpreters can properly invoke it to contradict clear and specific
statutory text; they focus, instead, on "cases in which statutory language is unclear.""' Thus, Vermeule's illustration does not really ad54 See, for example, Young v United States, 535 US 43, 49-51 (2002) (applying a longstanding "background principle" to read an equitable tolling exception into a federal statute of limitation); NationalPrivate Truck Council, Inc v Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 US 582,588 (1995)
(inferring an exception to 42 USC § 1983 on the strength of "the background presumption that
federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state taxes"); United States v Mezzanatto, 513 US 196, 203--04 (1995) (reading federal rules in light of the "background presumption that legal rights ...are subject to waiver by voluntary agreement of the parties"); Staples v
United States, 511 US 600, 605 (1994) (reading a mens rea requirement into seemingly broad
statutory language); Leuthner v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Northeastern Pennsylvania,454 F3d
120, 125 (3d Cir 2006) ("As a matter of statutory interpretation ...Congress is presumed to incorporate background prudential standing principles, unless the statute expressly negates them.").
55 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S Cal L
Rev 845, 847 (1992). See also Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 38 (cited in note 3) (observing that
"virtually all interpreters today-both self-proclaimed textualists and purposivists-tend to
exclude legislative history if the text, in context, otherwise is clear"). But see Exxon Mobil Corp
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dress what judges should do when an agency's deviation from the surface-level meaning of a particular provision rests on a respectable application of some recognized tool of statutory construction.
If other parts of his analysis are any guide, though, Vermeule
would have judges defer to agency interpretations of this sort. The
reason that Vermeule wants judges to focus on surface meaning when
left to their own devices is that, as he understands the available empirical information, their use of more complex interpretive techniques
would consume resources without producing any predictable benefits.
Vermeule believes that the calculus is different for interpreters in specialist agencies; they can apply the same interpretive techniques more
cheaply and accurately, and so their use of complex interpretation has
some positive expected value. According to Vermeule, moreover, that
value might well exist even when judges would say that a provision
has a clear surface meaning; as compared to judges, "agencies are likely
to be in a better position to know whether departures from the text will
seriously diminish predictability or otherwise unsettle the statutory
scheme," and so "the case for formalistic interpretation by judges is
stronger than the case for formalistic interpretation by agencies"
(p 213). Thus, Vermeule suggests that reviewing judges should allow
agencies not only to resolve ambiguities in the statutes that they administer, but also to select the interpretive approach that is used to identify
those ambiguities (pp 213-14). More generally, Vermeule seems inclined to have judges defer to agencies whenever there is any "reasonable basis for interpretive dispute" (p 233)-even if the dispute arises
because the agency has adopted a more complex method of interpretation than Vermeule advises judges to use in the agency's absence.
The idea that reviewing courts should extend Chevron deference
to an agency's choice of interpretive method does not necessarily
hinge on Vermeule's other positions. Thus, even if one rejects Vermeule's efforts to develop an alternative to standard forms of textualism and purposivism, one must still consider the possibility that reviewing courts should leave the choice between these standard interpretive methods up to individual agencies. Again, however, I am not
entirely persuaded.

v Allapattah Services, Inc, 545 US 546, 125 S Ct 2611,2628 (2005) (Stevens dissenting) ("Because
ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is unwise to treat
the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative history is consulted.").
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1. Should textualist judges defer to an agency's choice
of purposivism?
Imagine that a particular judge has decided (for the reasons suggested in Part II of this Review) that when no agency is in the picture,
he will better advance the high-level goals of statutory interpretation
if he adopts standard textualist methods than if he follows Vermeule's
cruder approach. The harder choice is between textualism and purposivism, but let us suppose that this particular judge makes that
choice in favor of textualism too. He recognizes, of course, that statutes are mechanisms for members of Congress to achieve certain policy objectives, and he does not want the method of interpretation that
he adopts to raise unwarranted obstacles to the accomplishment of
the purposes that Congress as a whole collectively wanted to advance.
But he also recognizes that even when Congress as a whole collectively embraces particular goals, it still faces important policy questions about the nature of the statutory directives that will best promote those goals. In particular, Congress must decide how rule-like to
make those directives: should the relevant statute simply express the
goals that Congress is trying to achieve and leave implementing authorities in charge of deciding what is most likely to advance those
goals in each set of circumstances that arises, or should Congress
hardwire some such decisions into the statute itself, so that implementing authorities will sometimes have to take actions that they
themselves would not have identified as the best way of achieving
Congress's underlying purposes in the particular circumstances at
hand? 6 When attempting to identify any decisions that Congress has
authoritatively made on this point, our hypothetical judge sees no reason to apply background principles of interpretation that make statutory language less rule-like than it seems on its face. In other words,
our hypothetical judge identifies himself with textualism rather than
with purposivism: 7 at least with respect to statutes that courts must implement on their own, he believes that he will best advance the highlevel goals of statutory interpretation if he refrains from reading purpose-based embellishments into seemingly rule-like provisions.

56 For discussion of these issues, and of the costs and benefits that members of Congress
might consider as they decide how rule-like to make particular directives, see generally Frederick
Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in
Law and in Life (Oxford 1991).
57 See Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 398-403 (cited in note 3) (discussing what distinguishes
judges whom we think of as textualists from judges whom we think of as purposivists).
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A judge who accepts this tenet of textualism has no obvious reason to conclude that agency interpreters should be free to apply the
background principles that he has rejected for his own use. To be sure,
Congress may well cast statutory directives in less rule-like terms
when it is committing their administration to a specialist agency than
when the directives will be administered only by courts; members of
Congress might plausibly conclude that certain agencies are better
positioned than courts to decide what will advance Congress's underlying purposes in particular sets of circumstances. If Congress takes
account of agencies' superior capabilities at the drafting stage, though,
interpreters should not automatically invoke the same considerations
again to make the formulation that Congress has chosen even less
rule-like than it seems.
This point is sufficiently important that it is worth belaboring.
Suppose that members of Congress agree on a particular objective
and want to draft a statutory provision to promote that objective. In
their opinion, generalist judges cannot be trusted to figure out what
policies will advance Congress's chosen objective in any given situation. If Congress were entrusting administration of the provision directly to the courts, Congress would therefore make the provision
relatively rule-like; if one imagines a "ruleness" scale of zero to ten
(with zero representing the paradigmatic "standard" and ten the paradigmatic "rule"), Congress might choose language that makes the
provision a seven. But members of Congress instead plan to have a
specialist agency administer the provision, and they have more confidence in the agency's ability to exercise sound discretion about how
best to achieve Congress's underlying objectives in particular circumstances. They therefore draft the provision in such a way as to make it
a five. For textualist judges, the fact that the agency is better able than
courts to make direct application of Congress's purposes is no reason
to let the agency apply interpretive principles that effectively push the
provision's ruleness down to three; by hypothesis, Congress took the
agency's superior capabilities into account when it made the provision
a five rather than a seven. For the very same reasons that textualist
judges assume that Congress chooses the level of ruleness it wants when
it legislates for the courts, textualist judges are likely to assume that
Congress also chooses the level of ruleness it wants when it legislates
for agencies."
58
This analysis would lose force if agencies were better positioned than reviewing courts
to determine the level of ruleness that Congress intended to adopt. But except to the extent that
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Admittedly, there are some other respects in which textualist
judges might think it perfectly fine for agencies to use interpretive
techniques that are not associated with textualism. For instance, if an
agency wants to consult publicly available legislative history to help it
resolve some ambiguity in statutory language that it administers, textualist judges will generally let the agency do so; as long as the judges
agree that the relevant provision is genuinely ambiguous, and as long
as the agency's interpretation stays within what the judges regard as
the permissible bounds (which textualist judges might determine
without regard to the legislative history), judges will not reject the
agency's interpretation simply because they would not themselves
have paid attention to the legislative history.59 For reasons that I have
discussed elsewhere,60 however, debates about the proper use of legislative history strike me as less central to the practical differences be-

tween textualism and purposivism than disagreements about whether
to take a statute's level of ruleness at face value. On that crucial topic,

a judge who is committed to textualism for courts is unlikely to think
that agencies should be free to be purposivists.
2.

Should purposivist judges defer to an agency's choice

of textualism?
By the same token, a judge who is committed to purposivism
might well see no reason to approve agency interpretations that can
be defended only in textualist terms. To the extent that the differences

between purposivism and textualism entail disagreements about the
high-level goals of statutory interpretation, so that the type of "meaning" that purposivist judges seek differs from the type of "meaning"
that textualist judges seek, 61 neither set of judges is likely to think that
agencies have access to inside information of the sort that interpreters should not consider, it is
not apparent why that would be true. See Part III.A.
Indeed, a regime in which agencies consider legislative history while reviewing courts do
59
not may be a good way of finessing disputes about whether the use of legislative history tends to
restrict or to expand interpreters' discretion. See note 7 and accompanying text. To the extent
that legislative history is a useful restraint on interpreters' discretion, it will have a salutary effect
on agency decisions; to the extent that agencies try to use legislative history to create ambiguity
where none exists, reviewing courts will rein them in. The legal system as a whole might thus get
the best of both worlds.
See Nelson, 91 Va L Rev 347,348-49,368-69 (cited in note 3).
60
On one account, for instance, the concept of "meaning" that is central to textualism
61
focuses on the semantic import of the text that Congress enacted, while the concept of "meaning" that is central to purposivism is more receptive to inferences (drawn from the publicly
available evidence) about exceptions or embellishments that members of the enacting Congress
probably would have wanted to incorporate into the text if the relevant questions had occurred
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the relevant concept of "meaning" changes whenever Congress gets
an agency involved. Of course, the most significant differences between purposivism and textualism may not reflect disagreements
about the high-level goals of interpretation at all; purposivist judges
may simply disagree with textualist judges about the pragmatic methods that will bring courts closest to achieving those goals. Given their
stance in this debate, however, purposivist judges will resist the idea
that textualism can be good for agencies even though it is not good for
courts. After all, the pragmatic argument for embracing textualism
over purposivism is driven by constraints on interpreters' information
and capabilities. A judge who does not consider those constraints sufficient to justify textualism even for generalist courts is unlikely to
think textualism appropriate for the more expert decisionmakers in
specialist agencies.
3. Should the stalemate of empirical intuitions affect
these questions?
The combined conclusion of the two previous parts-that textualist judges will see no reason to defer to an agency's choice of purposivism, while purposivist judges will see no reason to defer to an agency's
choice of textualism-may itself seem to supply a powerful reason for
such deference. As Vermeule notes, the judiciary as a whole is unlikely
to coordinate upon either textualism or purposivism (pp 129-30); both
camps are well represented, and the stalemate of empirical intuitions
means that neither camp is likely to persuade the other. If the judiciary
remains divided between textualists and purposivists, and if each camp
tries to impose its preferred methodology on the same administrative
agencies, reviewing courts risk engaging in a tug-of-war over those
agencies' methods, producing considerable costs but no lasting benefits.
This problem may seem especially severe for agencies whose interpretations are equally likely to come before a variety of different
courts, as opposed to agencies that face more concentrated review in a
single federal court (such as the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit). Not only does the D.C. Circuit have many fewer
judges than the federal judiciary as a whole, but it follows the standard
rule that individual panels set binding precedent for the circuit; thus,
different panels are unlikely to give an agency mutually exclusive
commands about how to interpret the very same provision. Yet even
to them. See generally John F Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?,106 Colum
L Rev 70 (2006).
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agencies that can keep their eyes primarily on the D.C. Circuit must
announce particular interpretations without knowing which judges
will sit on the panels that review them. If textualist judges do not defer
to agency purposivism and purposivist judges do not defer to agency
textualism, the judges put agencies in an awkward position.
If Vermeule is correct about the judiciary's low capacity for coordination, however, individual judges cannot necessarily solve this
problem. Even if they personally defer to each agency's decision about
whether to embrace textualism or purposivism, their colleagues may
well engage in the same old tug-of-war. Especially when multiple different courts all have jurisdiction over cases that implicate an agency's
interpretation (which is when the tug-of-war problem is greatest), the
decisions that any individual judge makes about whether to defer to
the agency's methodological choices might have no discernible impact
on how the judiciary as a whole interacts with the agency. The desire
to produce good systemic effects might therefore be a weak reason for
individual judges to tolerate methodological choices with which they
disagree.6
If judges do not defer to individual agencies' decisions about
whether to be textualists or purposivists, moreover, the current methodological divisions within the federal judiciary may actually produce
some good systemic effects of their own. Vermeule is quite correct
that as things currently stand, neither Congress nor administrative
agencies can know whether the judges who confront their handiwork
will be textualists or purposivists; an individual judge therefore should
not embrace textualism because of the feedback effects that might
ensue if all judges were textualists. What Congress and administrative
agencies can know, however, is that some judges are textualists and
others are purposivists. Knowledge of these very divisions can itself
have useful feedback effects. Most notably, an administrative agency
that confronts a divided federal judiciary, and that cannot know
whether its interpretation of a particular statutory provision will be
reviewed by textualist judges or by purposivist judges, might try to
develop an interpretation that is acceptable to both camps.

The tug-of-war problem might conceivably give individual judges a reason to defer to
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each agency's varying methodological choices if the judiciary as a whole seemed more likely to
coordinate on that approach than on either textualism or purposivism. But it is not clear why
that would be true, and Vermeule does not suggest that it is. Instead, he maintains that the benefits of his approach are "strictly marginal or divisible" and do not assume any coordination
among judges (p 226).
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Because the differences between textualism and purposivism are
not nearly so stark as the rhetoric of the two camps sometimes suggests, such overlaps will often be possible. To the extent that there is
indeed "severe uncertainty" about whether textualism or purposivism
is best, moreover, it seems affirmatively desirable for agencies to seek
them out. Ironically, the system that gives agencies the greatest incentive to do so may be the system in which textualist judges and purposivist judges each insist that their chosen methodology is correct.
IV. CONCLUSION

When books begin as a series of law-review articles, their authors
often have difficulty weaving them into a coherent theme. Not so
Vermeule; he integrates his prior work smoothly and effectively. To be
sure, a few seams do show: it is odd to find an extensive "case study"
of a single Supreme Court decision (pp 86-117)" in a book that promises to deemphasize "concrete cases and examples" (p 6), and sections
of the book based on Vermeule's earlier articles do not always seem to
take full account of his recent insights about the judiciary's low capacity for coordination in matters that have a political valence. But Vermeule has succeeded admirably in distilling eight years of articles into
a sustained and cohesive argument.
Even readers (like me) who resist his broad conclusions, moreover, will profit from the more particularized insights that leap off his
pages. The book is overflowing with important points; Vermeule's observation that what individual judges should do cannot always be determined by what one would like the judiciary as a whole to do, his
reasons for skepticism about arguments premised on feedback effects,
his distinction between situations of genuine uncertainty and situations in which decisionmakers can put more stock in their empirical
intuitions, his recognition of the practical importance of the relationship between Chevron deference and the interpretive tools that courts
use when no agency is in the picture, and a host of other insights are
all significant contributions to the legal literature. Above all, his call
for decisionmakers in every institution to have a decent humility, and
to make honest appraisals of what they do and do not know, is advice
that all should heed.

63 This chapter is based on Vermeule's important article Legislative History and the Limits
of JudicialCompetence:The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833 (1998).

